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The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn – he used this 
term to denote the specifi c approach applied by a school of reasearch to examine its subject matter. 
Researchers using the same paradigm seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar meth-
ods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system 
paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical 
considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience on post-socialist transition. 
The fi rst part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and 
concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for 
North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which 
classifi es prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identifi ed: 
democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratiza-
tion. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 post-socialist countries, only a tenth 
of the population live in democracy, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in 
this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, 
where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form – here we can 
fi nd important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This fi nding 
is compatible with the observation that there are some, less fundamental, characteristics unique to 
Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.1
Keywords: autocracy, democracy, capitalist system, socialist system, post-socialist transition, 
Hungary
JEL classifi cation indices: B4, P1, P2, P3, P5
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INTRODUCTION
What prompted this study? What type of readers am I addressing? My prime mo-
tivation in my academic life has been to discover what kind of society we live in, 
what its characteristics may be. As any researcher does, I have taken a conceptual 
apparatus and methodology as a point from which to view my subject matter. 
Still, as most researchers, I have rarely chosen the method itself, the outlook or 
approach driving my research, as the subject of a separate paper. The primary aim 
of my article “The System Paradigm” (Kornai 2000) was to summarize my prin-
ciples in the theory of science. Seventeen years have passed since and I have been 
much influenced by new experiences: the changes that have occured in China, the 
consolidation of the Putin regime, and most strongly of all, the events in Hungary 
under the political group headed by Viktor Orbán, the prime minister since the 
election in 2010. It is high time to review the conceptual framework, along with 
some other matters underlying comparative systems theory.
This study is intended above all for past and future readers studying my works, 
whether many or few. Apart from them, I target researchers into comparative eco-
nomics, comparative political science and comparative sociology, and historians 
of the present-day period; researchers working at universities, research institutes, 
international bodies, financial institutions, and think tanks, or more specifically, 
those who professionally analyze the changes occurring in the post-socialist re-
gion.
One aim is to sum up, more thoroughly than my first study of the system 
paradigm did, some elements of my conceptual and analytical apparatus. I do not 
offer a survey of the literature on the problem. Were I to do so I would need to 
deal proportionately with views, concepts and methodological principles I agree 
with, and those I consider incorrect. I am not setting out to do that, I am simply 
setting out to describe my own paradigm. I mention others’ works only if I wish 
to stress my agreement with them, or the fact of adopting something from theirs 
into my own thinking – or if I dispute their statements. In that sense the study is 
not balanced or impersonal, and cannot be so.2
Although these aims have motivated me, I hope the study will go beyond my 
message concerning the theory of science, and as a side-product assist the reader 
in understanding some major phenomena of our time. For example, Huntington 
spoke of democracy’s “third wave” (Huntington 1991). Where has it gone? Is it 
2  With most subjects it is thought immodest for authors to quote their own works repeatedly 
and thus to crowd the bibliography, but many such references are inevitable if the subject is an 
author’s own work. This study is aimed primarily at those who have read my works, whom I 
am trying to assist in the “maintenance” of their ideas evoked by those works.
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moving on or has it retreated? Or what place does Viktor Orbán’s Hungary hold 
in comparative systems theory? Is it a specific Hungarian model, a “Hungari-
cum,” or does it have close or distant relatives?3
1. THE CAPITALIST VERSUS THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM
System
The word “system” in everyday language and in many sciences occurs in several 
different senses, from the universe to living organisms, man-made machinery to 
various human communities, existing, directly observable systems to notional, 
intellectual ones. In all cases this term conveys the meaning that several lesser 
parts form a coherent whole. These parts interact. They are not separate items 
thrown together, for there are comprehensible relations among them organizing 
them into a structure. The first part of the study uses the term “system” with two 
meanings. I compare the socialist and the capitalist systems. On occasions I add 
an attribute, calling them the two great systems,4 but the attribute contains no 
value judgement: I am not bowing before the greatness of either.
A distinct, specific system may emerge in a country over a shorter or longer 
period, as far as a distinct combination of forms of political power, dominant ide-
ology, ownership relations, and coordination of social activities are concerned. In 
this sense it has become customary to refer even colloquially to the Putin system 
or Orbán system. The use of the word system here has an important clarifying 
force: it points to the mutual effects of various elements in the public state of af-
fairs, operation of the country, and structure of the machinery of power.
I use the capitalism versus socialism pair of concepts purely in a descriptive, 
positive sense. I am not referring to an imaginary socialism – not to conditions 
that socialists or communists think should pertain under a socialist system – but 
to existing socialism (to fall back on an old communist party jargon). Likewise, 
3  The term “Hungaricum” was used originally to mark goods which are produced in Hungary 
and became worldwide known as “Tokaji aszú”, a desert wine called ‘The King of Wines’ 
already in the Middle Ages, or “barackpálinka”, a brandy made from apricot. 
4  What I call a great system is related, but not identical, to the Marxist “mode of production” or 
the neo-Marxist concept of “social formation.” I stand aloof from the simplified, primitive the-
ory that political economy lecturers of the socialist period would drum into seminar students, 
citing in a deterministic, ostensibly “progressive” order of primitive communism, slave-own-
ing society, feudalism, capitalism, and finally, victorious socialism or its full-fledged version, 
communism.
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I am not examining an imaginary capitalism – not what uncritical devotees of 
capitalism think should be present – but existing capitalism, as it is. 
I obviously did not invent the two terms. Historians of ideas report that both 
expressions antedate Marx, “capitalism” appearing in Louis Blanc and Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon, and “socialism” in the works of Henri de Saint-Simon. 
However, they became widespread through Marx’s main work Capital (Marx 
1867/1990, 1885/1992, 1894/1992), and not simply among Marxists, believers 
in socialism and antagonists of capitalism. They are used by several moderate or 
radical opponents of socialism as well, such as Ludwig von Mises and Joseph 
Schumpeter (Mises 1922/1981; Schumpeter 1942/2010). These days they are 
heard constantly from politicians and the media, and have been taken up in eve-
ryday speech, as well.
However, it must be said that many people avoid this pair of concepts. With 
“capitalism” there are several reasons. Former reform communists were ashamed 
to find formations of capitalism appearing out of their efforts. German economic 
politicians after the Second World War, sensing anti-capitalist feelings among 
broad swathes of voters, thought it wise to give the long-standing system a new 
name: “social market economy”.5 Nor are conservative populists fond of calling 
their institutional creation capitalism, as they wish to be seen as anti-profit, anti-
bank anti-capitalists.
There are several considerations behind the avoidance of the term “socialist” 
as well. Marxists reserve the word “communist” for the Marxian vision, where 
people share goods according to their needs. Existing socialism was seen as a 
transitional state that would last only until communism appeared.6 Meanwhile 
many Westerners, including politicians, scholars and journalists, referred consist-
ently to the Soviet Union and other countries controlled by communist parties as 
“communist countries”, and do so to this day. The same people would reserve the 
term “socialist” for the welfare states created by social democratic parties.
It is vital in the theory of science to distinguish sharply between the content of 
a concept and the name it bears. Many terms in the social sciences and the politi-
cal sphere have a political slant – associations redolent of value judgements and 
Weltanschauung. In this respect, it is impossible to reach a consensus on terms. 
5  Nowadays, when the use of the term “varieties of capitalism” is widespread, we could say: 
they wanted to create a variety of capitalism with strong welfare-state characteristics. This 
intention was inherent in the term “social market economy”, dissociating the capitalism of 
Northern and Western Europe from its Anglo-American counterpart.
6  While the socialist system existed, no country in the bloc ever termed itself communist. That is 
why I entitled my work The Socialist System, not the “Communist”, which many would have 
recognized more easily. It can be disputed whether the decision was apt, but it left no room for 
misunderstanding, as I wrote down clearly what I meant by “socialist system” (Kornai 1992).
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My experience, especially in the academic world, is that people cling more tight-
ly to their vocabularies than to the views they express with the words included in 
those vocabularies. Their compulsive insistence is upon a vocabulary which have 
been hammered into their heads, or to use a more elegant term, which has become 
imprinted in their minds by the reading matter and lectures that have affected 
them most. If that is how it was put by Marx, Max Weber or Polányi (or whoever 
made the biggest impression on them), it cannot be put otherwise. Or it may hap-
pen that the favored term is one they invented themselves and wish to establish as 
their own terminological innovation.
I abandoned long ago my efforts to end the conceptual confusions. I acknowl-
edged that an absence of conceptual consensus often leads to a dialogue of the 
deaf. This applies not only to the capitalism versus socialism pair of concepts, 
but to many other expressions, on which this study touches later (e. g., democracy 
versus dictatorship). I am attempting only to ensure that readers of my works will 
understand clearly what one expression or another means in my vocabulary.
Types and their characteristics
The capitalist system and the socialist system represent two types of socio-polit-
ical formation in the recent past and in the present.
The creation of a typology is among the major steps in scientific examination. 
It has played a big part in developing many disciplines (e.g., biology, genetics, 
medicine, linguistics, cognitive sciences, anthropology or psychology).7 A type 
is a theoretical construct. Actual, individual historical constructs such as Hitler’s 
Germany or Churchill’s UK differ from each other in important respects. None-
theless, I describe, within my own conceptual apparatus, both of them as capital-
ist countries. Similarly different in their essential characteristics were Stalin’s 
Soviet Union, Kádár’s Hungary and Ceaușescu’s Romania. Still, I call all three 
socialist countries. To distinguish the types within a typology calls for describ-
ing their characteristics, which may differ sharply.8 Here the task is to find the 
characteristics which, on the one hand, distinguish the two types, the capitalist 
and socialist systems; and on the other hand, they show what is common to the 
many individual phenomena ocurring in each country belonging to the same type 
in a given period.
7  Of special interest are the typologies of modern psychology and the cognitive sciences. Study-
ing these could be very useful to comparative system theory in the social sciences.
8  There are several synonyms for the word “characteristic” in this context: trait, feature or at-
tribute, for example.
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Although a type is a theoretical construct existing only in researchers’ minds, it 
is based on the observation of reality and underlines important common features 
of past and present structures. Given the specific realizations of the “great sys-
tem” that vary between countries and periods, the type is created to embody their 
common characteristics in a theoretical generalization.9 So the usable, operable 
typology is based on observation of the historical reality. Social science distils it 
from experience.
In the rest of this study I employ the pairs capitalist system/capitalism and 
socialist system/socialism as synonymous.10
In creating types, the method here is to pick out the various characteristics 
in which each type differs markedly from the others. The aim is not profuse de-
scription. On the contrary, it is to grasp the relatively few, highly characteristic, 
conspicuous features. The best would be to list as few as possible – simply those 
necessary and sufficient for differentiation.11 I do not claim that the number of 
such characteristics should be exactly nine; I would be open to altering Table 1 if 
there were convincing arguments for doing so.
It is essential to list among the characteristics only those that are system-spe-
cific. The comparative table should by no means include phenomena which are 
found frequently in both great systems, important and influential though they 
may be to the operation of certain institutions or the lives of citizens. For ex-
ample, repression cannot appear as a system characteristic because it does not 
appear exclusively under the socialist system. Ruthless examples have occurred 
and continue to occur under the capitalist system as well: in Hitler’s Germany, 
in Hungary under the Horthy and the Nazi Arrow-Cross regime, Franco’s Spain, 
and many Latin American military dictatorships. Under both systems it may hap-
pen that incompetent people gain leading positions. In both, the major economic 
indicators fluctuate strongly. However great the effects of these phenomena, they 
are not system-specific.
9  In my phraseology, I employ the unqualified word “type.” It has the same meaning as what 
Max Weber calls an “ideal type” (Weber 1922/2007). Yet I avoid Weber’s term, since I find 
that the attribute “ideal” has a distractingly normative ring. However, Weber too used the 
expression “ideal type” to denote an abstract theoretical mapping of existing systems.
10  The second term in each pair (capitalism and socialism, respectively) denotes, for many au-
thors, a system of ideas rather than a formation that exists or has existed. It should be clear 
from the context that I am discussing the latter: “capitalism” denotes the capitalist system as 
it exists or has existed, “socialism” likewise.
11  Table 1 contains many expressions I have taken over from my earlier works, where I discussed 
their meanings in detail. They include coordination mechanism, market and bureaucratic coor-
dination, shortage economy, surplus economy, labor shortage, labor surplus, revolutionary in-
novation, soft and hard budget constraints. For space reasons I cannot go into these again here.
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I do not want to give an impression of exactitude. In describing the charac-
teristics, I have to allow myself to use umbrella terms such as “state ownership” 
and “private ownership,” although I know that both categories can take many dif-
ferent legal forms.12 There appear repeatedly in the table words like “dominant” 
and “largely”, without mention of a quantitative value for them. If it is 70 per 
cent, then it is dominant but if it is 69 per cent, it is not? I content myself with 
not describing the system in terms of quantification but in a qualitative fashion, 
and relying on the intuition of those using the conceptual apparatus, in the hope 
that they will likewise sense the meaning of these inadequately precise words. 
My professional conscience is quieted by knowing that many scientific typolo-
gies do the same. Taking that into account, caution must be shown in using such 
typologies: there are some analytical tasks to which they are fitted and some to 
which they are not.
12  The category of state ownership includes both central- and local-government ownership. This 
needs mentioning as the Hungarian vernacular often inaccurately confines state ownership to 
central-government ownership. If a school, say, or a hospital passes from local-government 
into central-government hands, this is labelled “nationalization”, while it means only that 
the execution/implementation of the state’s ownership rights has been centralized, important 
though that change may be as well.
Table 1. Characteristics of the capitalist and socialist systems
No. Capitalist system Socialist system
Primary characteristics
1 The ruling political group ensures the 
dominance of private property and market 
coordination
The ruling political group, i.e., the Commu-
nist Party, enforces the dominance of public 
property and bureaucratic coordination
2 Dominant form of property: private owner-
ship
Dominant form of property: state ownership
3 Dominant form of coordination mechanism: 
market coordination 
Dominant form of coordination mechanism: 
bureaucratic coordination
Secondary characteristics
4 Surplus economy, i.e., the buyers’ market, is 
the dominant state of the market for goods 
and services
Shortage economy, i.e., the sellers’ market, 
is the dominant state of the market for 
goods and services
5 Labor surplus is the dominant state of the 
labor market
Labor shortage is the dominant state of the 
labor market
6 Fast technical progress; the system often 
generates revolutionary innovation
Slow technical progress; the system rarely 
generates revolutionary innovation
7 High income inequality Low income inequality
8 Hard budget constraint for organizations in 
a quite broad sphere
Soft budget constraint for organizations in a 
quite broad sphere
9 Direction of corruption: it is mostly the 
seller who bribes the buyer
Direction of corruption: it is mostly the 
buyer who bribes the seller
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Another reason I tend to use expressions like “dominant” and “largely” is be-
cause I know that there can appear in a given type of country phenomena that dif-
fer from, or are even contrary to, the dominant phenomenon. For example, while 
the Soviet or Polish economy was tormented by the shortage economy there were 
still unsold goods in the stores and warehouses. In the western world with its typi-
cal surplus economy, there are long queues of consumers waiting for tickets to a 
new and exciting film.
Is there not a discrepancy of size in comparing capitalism, which has been 
around for centuries and will probably continue to exist for several more, with 
socialism, which existed historically for only a few decades and then collapsed? 
Is my reason for bringing the latter up not that I was a citizen under the social-
ist system for much of my life? I firmly answer both questions in the negative. 
Now, 25 years after the collapse, I am convinced that such a comparison has 
great explanatory power. History, at a price of suffering for millions of people, 
set up a laboratory experiment by bringing into being a system markedly dif-
ferent from capitalism. Comparing them yields a better understanding of what 
capitalism is. Such randomly generated experiments also teach a lot in other 
branches of science. Examining the victim of an accident marked an important 
step in neurology. Part of the patient’s brain was damaged and researchers knew 
precisely which part, and from that they could deduce what functions that part 
of the brain played.
What is to be understood by a hierarchy of characteristics? How do primary 
and secondary characteristics differ?13 In my line of thought, primary character-
istics determine the system as a whole, including secondary characteristics. The 
joint presence of the primary characteristics is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the appearance of the secondary ones. It could also be said that primary 
characteristics form the minimum conditions for the existence of the capitalist or 
the socialist system. A sensible first stage when beginning to study a country is 
to concentrate on these primary characteristics. The results of doing so will then 
have predictive force. However, the primary characteristics do not generate all 
the secondary ones in a deterministic way. The effect is stochastic. There is a very 
good chance of finding the secondary characteristics in a country examined if the 
primary characteristics have already been identified.
This relationship is shown in Figure 1. The figure shows mutual effects: the 
primary and secondary characteristics have mutual influences on each other. The 
thick arrow denotes that the primary characteristics are the decisive ones, and the 
thin arrow in the opposite direction that the reactive influence is less strong.
13 Basic and fundamental are commonly used synonyms for “primary” in this context.
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The expression “decisive,” as I have noted already, shows a tendency, not full 
determination. Many people whose forebears have suffered from heart disease 
will inherit that susceptibility. But whether the disease actually emerges depends 
to a large extent on the patients’ way of life – if they drink alcohol, smoke, fail 
to take exercise, or find themselves in stressful situations, they are more likely to 
suffer acute heart disease than if they live moderate, cautious lives, do sports and 
live calmly. All socialist systems are inclined to develop a shortage economy, but 
the intensity of shortage was very strong in the 1980s in the Soviet Union, Poland 
and Romania, but less so in East Germany (Kornai 1980a, 2014c).
Within the two blocs shown in Figure 1 there are also interactions among the 
characteristics. To simplify the explanation, these are ignored in the figure and in 
this textual commentary on it.
Classifying the post-socialist region’s countries by the typology of capitalist versus 
socialist systems
Let us apply the conceptual apparatus introduced above to the countries which 
qualified as socialist countries in 1987 (Kornai 1992). Altogether 47 countries be-
long here; let us call the area they occupied the post-socialist region.14 The word 
14  Like many authors, I apply the epithet “post-socialist” to the countries that were under the 
control of the communist party in 1989–90. Here again there appears a conceptual mix-up: 
many politicians and political analysts apply the labels “post-socialist” or “post-communist”, 
usually with a pejorative ring, to parties that emerged from the former ruling communist party 
after the change of system, taking over many officials of the previous party and most of its 
assets. This they do regardless of what changes have occurred in the leadership or membership 
or in its ideology.
Figure 1. Interactions between the primary and secondary characteristics
Primary Dharacteristics
1. Relation of the political
sphere to property forms and 
coordination mechanisms
2. Dominant form of property
3. Dominant coordination mechanism
Secondary Dharacteristics
4. Power relations between the two sides 
of the market for goods and services
5. Power relations between the two sides 
of the labor market
6. Speed and qualitative features of 
technical progress
7. Income distribution 
8. Softness/hardness of the budget constraint
9. Direction of corruption
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“region” is not applied in a geographical sense, as this is not a group of adjacent 
countries; most are in Europe and Asia, but some in Africa and Latin America 
also belong here.15
15  A list of the post-socialist countries appears on my website (http://www.kornai-janos.hu/Kor-
nai2016-SP-revisited.html), as Tables 1 and 2 in Background Material 1. 
Socialist countries
Capitalist countries
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The locations of the post-socialist region on the world map appear in Figure 
2. The countries of the post-socialist region are marked with various non-white 
shades in the figure. The other parts of the world, marked in white, never went 
through a socialist-system phase of rule by a communist party.
North Korea
Figure 2. World map, 2013–2015. Categories of post-socialist countries according 
to the “capitalist vs. socialist” typology
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Rule under the socialist system is marked in black.16 The whole region would 
be black if the map showed the situation in 1987. Now the only spot of black on 
the world map is the territory of one country, North Korea – a tiny dot on the map 
of the world. Countries in transition from socialism to capitalism are marked in 
dark grey. Again, this applies to only one country, Cuba, making a single spot of 
dark grey at a global scale. Most of the region is colored light grey: these are the 
countries where the capitalist system operates.17 
A sizeable part of the region has a diagonally striped pattern. This denotes 
uncertainty: I am uncertain whether these countries should be marked black, light 
grey or dark grey.
The sources for placing the countries in these categories are considered again 
in the comments on another world map (Figure 3). There I will shed light on the 
relation between the two world maps and the background materials accessible on 
my website.18
There is a broad if not full consensus among experts as to when the change of 
system occurred in the countries affected. This expression, often used in political 
jargon and everyday speech, gains considerable content in the conceptual and 
analytical framework already discussed. With a few exceptions, the countries in 
the group qualifying as socialist in 1987 all have undergone a transition from 
socialism to capitalism.
16  Background Material 2, appearing on my website shows the two world maps, Figure 2 and 3, 
not in black-and-white but in various colors. The colors might help in recognizing the distribu-
tion of various types in the region.
17  Empirical support for the classifications would be much clearer if there were reliable statistics 
on the developments in ownership relations and the spread of the market mechanism. Unfor-
tunately, the data available are only partial and sporadic. All countries prepare statistics on 
production and added value, broken down by industries, geographical regions, occupations, or 
output produced, but nowhere do national statistical offices calculate or publish regularly any 
breakdown of output data by form of ownership, or the proportion of total production sold at 
administratively set prices. It is surprising to find that only non-state institutions in a handful 
of countries concern themselves with ownership relations and the radical transformation of 
coordination mechanisms, although these were among the basic requirements for the change 
of system. Prestigeous international organizations regularly publish comparative figures on 
production, foreign trade, or financial affairs, but – in my view – they pay insufficient atten-
tion to the transformation of ownership relations and the relative weights of bureaucratic and 
market coordination. 
18  See Background Material 2 and 3 on my website.
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Static representation and the transformations
Figure 2 presents a still image, as if a snapshot were taken of the world and a spe-
cific group of countries within it. The shot shows a static state of the present, but 
if a motion picture camera were to be used instead, it would show the dynamics 
of the changes of system as well.
The map conveys the presence of the two systems at a point in history when 
both are operating according to the characteristics apparent in Table 1.19 It does 
not depict the creation phase of the system. I draw attention to this primarily in 
connection with Characteristic 1. The initiatory role in the genesis of the socialist 
system is played by the political sphere; the communist party makes very rapid 
moves in historical terms to impose state ownership and centralized bureaucratic 
coordination on society. By comparison, the transitions in most countries from 
pre-capitalist forms to the capitalist system were very slow. Initially, the political 
authorities only tolerated and took advantage of the services and resources of the 
bourgeoisie. The relation of the political forces to capitalism changed gradually 
until they had become active defenders of private ownership, market coordina-
tion and enforcer of private contract. Different again was the role of the political 
sphere in the route back after 1989–1990 from socialism towards capitalism, in 
which the processes of transformation were instigated and headed by the pro-
capitalist political forces.
Only one country in Figure 2 is marked in dark grey, to show that it is in transi-
tion from socialism to capitalism. As mentioned before, the one country I put here 
when writing this study in 2016 was Cuba. Though a member of the Castro fam-
ily remains at the pinnacle of power, this is no longer the Cuba of Fidel Castro. 
Cautiously, the country has begun to display the characteristics of capitalism.
To continue the earlier comparison, of using a motion picture camera instead 
of taking a still image, many more countries would appear as dark grey in the 
squares representing the 1990s and 2000s. The speed of change and the pace of 
the transformation of certain characteristics varied from country to country.
Historians and historical recollections like to focus on a particular calendar 
date for the beginning or end of a historical period. The October Revolution in 
1917 Tsarist Russia is often understood to have been started by the blank shot 
from the Aurora cruiser signalling the attack on the Winter Palace in St. Peters-
burg. In fact, most period changes are more blurred in time.
Figure 2 shows the world-historical defeat of socialism through the lens of 
my conceptual apparatus. Three decades earlier, the socialist system prevailed 
over 34.7 per cent of the world’s population and 30.7 per cent of its area (Kornai 
19 Cuba is an exception. It has been qualified here as a country at a transitional stage.
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1992). Nowadays, when the socialist system persists only in North Korea, the 
proportions have shrunk to 0.3 per cent of the population and 0.1 per cent of 
the area.20 
The explanatory power of a capitalist-versus-socialist typology
When examining a complex historico-social phenomenon, it is rare to find a con-
vincing single-factor explanation to account for its appearance and/or long-term 
duration. Complex phenomena are complex indeed and call for a multi-factor 
explanation.
Both under capitalism and socialism appear several important complex phe-
nomena, explained by several factors; one of them is the system. I emphasize the 
word one because not for a moment do I claim that a full explanation of a certain 
complex phenomenon can be gained by simply pinpointing the great system in 
which it appears. But there can often be found within a larger ensemble of ex-
planatory factors some that are system-specific. Indeed, one or two may turn out 
to be the most important elements of explanation. Here are two examples.
One is the speed and quality attributes of technical progress, which is affected 
by several factors, e. g., the country’s level of economic development, the state 
of its education system, and the size of its state support for research. Along-
side these, the system-specific effects are notably important. It can be shown 
how large numbers of revolutionary innovations have appeared under capital-
ism, which deeply affect production and people’s lives, whereas the socialist sys-
tem could produce just one outside the arms industry (Kornai 2014c, pp. 3–24). 
Promising inventions that appeared in a socialist country could find no innovator 
able to spread it on a mass scale; this function would be usurped by a capitalist 
innovator instead. One well-known example is Ernő Rubik’s invention, Rubik’s 
Cube. In then-socialist Hungary, Rubik had no luck touting his creation round the 
industrial leaders. Rubik’s Cube began its worldwide conquest when its manu-
facture and mass marketing were taken over by capitalist firms abroad. Even the 
distribution process for this first pioneering innovation was immeasurably swifter 
under capitalist conditions than under the socialist system.
The other example is the labor-market situation. Search processes take place 
under all systems: employees seek employers that meet their needs and vice 
versa. The search process is accompanied by ubiquitous frictions: everywhere 
there are temporarily unfilled jobs and ready workers unable to find jobs. This 
is a complex matter explainable by many concurrent factors. One example is the 
20 See Background Material 4 on my website.
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flexibilty of knowledge generated by the education system. Does it facilite quick 
adjustment to the rapidly changing demand for labor? Other factors include legal 
contraints on dismissing employees, the effectiveness of labor recruitment agen-
cies, and so on. But some basic explanatory factors are system-specific. What are 
the general labor-market proportions of supply to demand? Does it tend towards 
excess supply (capitalism) or excess demand (socialism in its mature, relatively 
developed stage)? That determines to what extent employees are at the mercy 
of employers. An employee is under constant threat of dismissal and unemploy-
ment, they feel more defenceless than those who find jobs easily. Here we have 
arrived at deep-rooted system-specific effects, namely the relative power of em-
ployers and employees (Kornai 1980, 2014b).
The two examples enhance in a further way the argument for the explanatory 
power of the capitalism-versus-socialism typology. The nine system-specific fac-
tors listed in Table 1 were compiled with a positive approach. They do not reflect 
the author’s desires or choices of values. These are the characteristics of countries 
considered socialist or capitalist, an observable group from which the list of char-
acteristics in Table 1 can be “distilled.” Those who acknowledge this as a positive 
description, and shift to the normative approach, can append to them their views 
on the capitalism-versus-socialism pair, based on their own system of values. For 
my part, I do not reach any summary moral conclusion. By my system of values, 
dynamism and rapid technical advance form a great virtue in capitalism, but I 
see the risks and drawbacks of such development. For one, I see the vulnerability 
of the workforce as a repugnant characteristic of capitalism. As for the socialist 
system, it did not just have repulsive characteristics. Many of them were attrac-
tive: upward social mobility for the poor, some reduction in social distances, and 
employee security stemming from the labor shortage. The typology described 
above offers methodological assistance to evaluating the great systems. Value 
judgments should be based upon considering the whole set of characteristics for 
the system in question.
It is not unlike the marking system in education. Let us assume that the in-
dividual marks reflect each student’s attainments. Then it is up to the teachers, 
the parents, the classmates or the personnel department of a future workplace, to 
decide what configuration of the marks to take as a basis for forming an opinion 
of each student: the simple average of the marks, or the mark in some success-
ful subject taken by the evaluator to be the most important. I will return to this 
question later, but before discussing the value judgements about the great sys-
tems, let me present the typology I use for the alternative forms of politics and 
government.
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2. VARIETIES OF THE TWO GREAT SYSTEMS, ALTERNATIVE FORMS 
OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
The varieties of the great systems
Although the idea had a long theoretical history behind it, much attention was 
rightly paid in comparative systems theory to the work of Peter A. Hall and David 
Soskice on the varieties of capitalism (for their first comprehensive volume of 
studies, see Hall – Soskice 2001). This was a seminal idea which generated a 
school of thought: by now it is possible to talk of a broad and viable research 
program for examining the varieties of capitalism.21
Although this ground-breaking work discussed the varieties of the capitalist 
system only, it can be applied by analogy to those of the socialist system as well. 
The lively and complex debate that arose before the change of system, about so-
cialism’s alternative “economic mechanisms,” the various models of socialism, 
and the many possible forms that reform might take, can certainly be called a 
discourse on the varieties of socialism, although the word “variety” was not used 
in this sense. Here I see much of my own work as part of a research program into 
“varieties of systems,” though the works I can list did not use that term before the 
appearance of the works of Hall and Soskice, or for a long time after. Now, in this 
study, I too will apply this useful and operable expression.
There are several kinds of criteria on which to base the typology of varieties 
for each of the great systems. For instance, it is possible to produce a typology 
whose types represent the characteristic distribution of income and wealth. An-
other angle would be to measure how much the state intervenes in the operation 
of the economy and in what ways. Hall and Soskice brought these criteria to the 
fore in their study, which created and contrasted two main varieties: liberal mar-
ket economies and coordinated market economies. The prime example of the first 
is the economy of the United States and of the second that of Germany.
Baumol et al. (2007) employed other criteria in defining types of varieties: 
whether private initiative and the spirit of enterprise are strong or weak. They 
therefore named their varieties entrepreneurial capitalism versus oligarchic or 
state-run capitalism.
Bohle and Greskovits (2012) likewise came up with a new typology: capital-
ism is neo-liberal or embedded neo-liberal or neo-corporatist.
Acemoglu and Robinson’s book (2012) has had great influence. The authors 
put the exciting question of what explains why some nations fail at a turning 
21  The expression “research program” was introduced into the theory of science by Lakatos 
(1978), and it is used here in the sense applied by Lakatos.
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point and others succeed. They see as the major explanatory factor whether their 
social organisms are inclusive or exclusive. This is a typology with great explan-
atory power, although it does not preclude attention to other influential factors 
as well.
In the rest of this study I use another typology of varieties, not to replace those 
mentioned but to complement them. The main organizing criterion here is the 
politico-governmental form. This is not my invention. Both political scientists 
and political philosophers – beginning with ancient Greek philosophers, continu-
ing with Machiavelli and concluding with present-day researchers – attach huge 
importance to analysing the alternative forms of political power. This has been 
seminal throughout in political science and political philosophy. Sadly, the other 
social sciences, including economics (with estimable exceptions), have largely 
broken off from political science. My first study entitled “The System Paradigm”, 
appearing in 2000, merely touched on the relations of politics and the economy. 
The almost two decades since have taught me much, among other things, what a 
huge effect political structures and political ideas have, and how vital it is to ex-
amine in detail the course of history for an understanding of the transformations 
of society. It is necessary when analysing the “great” change of system not only 
to dissect it, but to know how the great change, the shift from socialism to capital-
ism, occurred, and what kind of formation it brought into being. Understanding 
that shift would have been sufficient motivation to write this second study on the 
system paradigm.
Democracy, autocracy and dictatorship
Political science has given rise to a great many typologies of politico-governmen-
tal forms. In this discipline too there appears the phenomenon mentioned earlier 
whereby authors cling tightly to their own conceptual systems or to those of some 
school of scholars to which they subscribe. The subject being politics, concept 
creation and interpretation are permeated by the differences of political opinion. 
In this respect this study is not meant to impose its system of concepts on anyone. 
I would like above all to clarify my own words. Having done so, I cannot go on 
here and there without arguing in their favor, pointing out the advantages of the 
phraseology I chose.22 
22  As I stated earlier, I am not expecting others to adopt my conceptual apparatus. But at this point 
Don Quixote begins to tilt at the windmill of conceptual clarification, in the vain hope that oth-
ers will be convinced of the advantages of the concepts and expressions I recommend.
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The typology of varieties that I employ distinguishes three types: democracy, 
autocracy and dictatorship. The characteristics of these types appear in Table 2.
The structure and logic of Table 2 follow Table 1 in distinguishing two great 
blocs: the primary and the secondary characteristics. Repetition is tiring, but let 
me stress again: the ensemble of primary characteristics contains the minimum 
conditions for distinguishing the three forms. It does not attempt a detail-rich 
description. On the contrary, it shows here solely the characteristics which jointly 
are sufficient and necessary for one or the other form to exist.
Characteristics 1 and 2 were expressed first by Schumpeter in Capitalism, So-
cialism and Democracy (1942/2010), and then utilized and developed further by 
Dahl (1983) and Huntington (1991).23 This approach singles out the procedural 
side of the processes of politics and exercising power as the main characteristic of 
democracy. Democracy has no need for the annihilation of a tyrant, for a military 
coup or a bloody uprising. There exists a bloodless, peaceful, civilized procedure 
for ousting the government: competition among several parties, then elections ac-
cording to legally endorsed procedures. The loser in a democracy concedes defeat 
and congratulates the winner.
The simultaneous presence of Characteristics 1 and 2 in Table 2 is necessary 
and sufficient to demarcate democracy and autocracy at one end of the political 
spectrum. Characteristics 3 and 4 are not needed for that purpose as there is no 
difference between the two in this respect. However, all four primary characteris-
tics must be weighed to distinguish autocracy and dictatorship at the other end of 
the political spectrum. Here Characteristic 3 comes to the fore: an autocracy has 
a legal opposition, albeit a weak one; an autocracy allows for a multi-party sys-
tem, while a dictatorship rests on a one-party system.24 Here Characteristic 4 be-
comes decisive: terror and bloodshed reign under dictatorship, claiming millions 
of lives. By comparison, power is exercised almost without bloodshed under the 
orderly conditions of an autocracy.25
23  Quoting these authors, I took this approach in my study of the change in politico-governmen-
tal forms that occurred in 1989–90 (Kornai 2006), at a time when few people in Hungary saw 
the possibility of voting out the government as an important criterion of democracy.
24  Here I ignore a few parties surviving from the former multi-party systems in socialist Poland, 
East Germany and China. They retained their party nature only in a formal sense, while sup-
porting the power of the communist party and operating under its control.
25  Putin has imprisoned several political opponents, but he has not used torture to extract confes-
sions. Arresting and sentencing to many years of imprisonment was done “legally”, based on 
the laws and legal forms of the regime. There is a ghastly suspicion that those in power may 
have ordered the murders of some opposition politicians and journalists, but unfeeling though 
it may sound, the figures must be considered when making comparisons. The number of mur-
ders committed in secret by the Russian autocracy may have been in the tens or hundreds, 
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but the number who lost their lives in Stalin’s terror was measured in millions, and those con-
demned to merciless forced labor in tens of millions.
Table 2. Characteristics of democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship
No. Democracy Autocracy Dictatorship
Primary characteristics
1 The government can be 
removed through a peaceful 
and civilized procedure
The government cannot be 
removed through a peaceful 
and civilized procedure
The government cannot be 
removed through a peaceful 
and civilized procedure
2 Institutions which jointly  
guarantee the conditions of 
removing the government 
are strong
Institutions which could 
jointly guarantee the 
conditions of removing the 
government are either formal 
or weak
Institutions which could 
jointly guarantee the 
conditions of removing the 
government do not exist
3 Legal parliamentary 
opposition exists; multiple 
parties run for elections
Legal parliamentary 
opposition exists; multiple 
parties run for elections
No legal parliamentary 
opposition; only one party 
runs for elections
4 No terror (large-scale 
detention in forced-labor 
camps and executions)
No terror (large-scale 
detention in forced-labor 
camps and executions), but 
various means of coercion 
are occasionally used 
against political adversaries 
(imprisonment with false 
allegation, or even politically 
motivated murder)
Terror (large-scale detention 
in forced-labor camps and 
executions)
Secondary characteristics
5 No repressive means are 
used against parliamentary 
opposition
Repressive means are 
used against parliamentary 
opposition
No parliamentary opposition
6 Institutions of “checks and 
balances” are active and 
independent
Institutions functioning as 
“checks and balances” are 
weak and non-independent
No institutions have been 
created to act as “checks and 
balances”
7 Relatively few officials 
are appointed by the ruling 
political group
The ruling political group 
appoints its own cadres to 
virtually all important offices
The ruling political group 
appoints its own cadres to all 
important offices
8 No legal constraints against 
civil protest; strong civil 
society
No legal constraints against 
civil protest; weak civil 
society
Civil protest against the 
government is prohibited 
by law
9 Interested persons and their 
organizations take part in 
many forms and to relevant 
degrees in preparations for 
decision-making (significant 
levels of participation)
There are legal frameworks 
for participation but they are 
practically not applied
Participation is not even 
formally prescribed
10 Freedom of the press is 
guaranteed by law, and is 
actually enforced
Freedom of the press is 
constrained by legal and 
economic means
No freedom of the press
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Absent from the primary characteristics is the question of how far a form ex-
presses the wishes of the populace. This is excluded from the criteria on two 
grounds. One is the strong difference between the positive and the normative 
approaches. The enquiry here is not into what the desirable characteristics of a 
democracy might be. Nor is it claimed that regimes lacking such characteristics 
do not merit the label democracy. It is simply what characteristics distinguish the 
existing alternative politico-governmental forms. To remain within the positive 
realm of analysis, are the democracies the ones that invariably express the will of 
the people? Sadly, it is not rare for an autocratic tyrant or a dictator to enjoy sin-
cere support from a large majority. Think of the masses of Germans, disillusioned 
by Weimar republic and sincerely supporting Hitler.
Two criteria applied when compiling the list of four primary characteristics 
and six secondary ones (as in Table 1). Each characteristic should appear in each 
case belonging to the type. In other words, it should be a characteristic common 
to all specific historical instances of some politico-governmental form. The other 
criterion is that a characteristic should distinguish one alternative type strongly 
from at least another. It may be that there are one or two more characteristics 
which satisfy both criteria. It may be that some characteristic should be described 
differently. I am open to all proposals that point in this direction. What I cannot 
abandon is the well articulated connection between the primary and secondary 
concept pairs. Within this interaction the effect of the primary characteristics is 
stronger than the force in the opposite direction – the primary characteristics are 
the ones that set the course of each country in a decisive way.
Autocracy, in this paradigm, is no blurred “middle way” between democracy 
and dictatorship, but a sharply identifiable type in the sense Max Weber termed 
an “ideal type”.26 It is a theoretical construct that in my approach is distinct from 
two other types: democracy and dictatorship.
When I began to apply this typology in earlier writings, several people ques-
tioned why I was isolating exactly three types. I replied that the number three has 
no special attraction for me. I gladly accept other typologies involving two or four 
types. I am concerned solely with discerning markedly different formations.
I appreciate that many social scientists can work more easily with a concept 
“system” that sees current politico-governmental forms as a “mixture” – each re-
gime displaying elements of democracy and dictatorship in different proportions. 
I do not want to dissuade them. I see this is more convenient for their ideas, but 
mine call for the use of strongly outlined types.
26 See the earlier footnote 9. 
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This study deals only with politico-governmental forms prevalent in the post-
socialist region, but if it extended to the whole world, it would be clear that autoc-
racy as a type can be used profitably to analyze other regions as well.
There are vital aspects, with huge effects on the destinies of nations and in-
dividuals, which I have not accounted for in the politico-governmental forms of 
the triple typology. Here is one example: the concept of nationalism and policy 
governed thereby. Democracy gives no protection here either: think of the horrific 
First World War. Before it broke out, most politicians on both sides had fuelled the 
insurgent tensions, including the leading statesmen of French and British democ-
racies, and then the outbreak sent a wave of nationalistic fervor over most people 
in both democracies. Nor were socialist countries immunized from nationalistic 
politics by the internationalist idea that workers of all lands should unite. Note, 
for example, the inter-socialist Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979. I believe in democ-
racy but do not find it ideal. To quote Churchill’s classic remark, “It has been said 
that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms 
that have been tried from time to time.”27 I see it as an especially important virtue 
that while it lasts, the government can be removed in a civilized way.
The hardness and softness of autocracy and dictatorship
The common characteristic of autocracy and dictatorship is control from above. 
The hierarchical pyramid has one person at its peak – a leader, autocrat or dicta-
tor whom no one orders around. Moving down from the peak, those at each level 
behave in two ways: obedient upwards and domineering downwards. Only at the 
bottom do people obey orders, but have no one to domineer.
There is a strong centralizing tendency that applies in both autocracy and dic-
tatorship. Both systems are liable to subject to the central will as many activities 
and spheres as possible.
There are many means of asserting the central will: reward and punishment, 
primarily the actual award of recompense and the actual imposition of penal-
ties, but promises and threats have their place too. People’s actions are strongly 
influenced by the hope that unconditional loyalty will win favor and the fear that 
disloyalty will lead to reprisals.
Softness or hardness of political power refer overall to the nature of the means 
of coercion applied from above. Let us look at Characteristic 4 in Table 2. One 
of the factors distinguishing autocracy and dictatorship is that the former does 
not use bloodthirsty terror or other brutal means of oppression. My generation 
27 Quoted from Churchill’s speech of 11 November 1947 in Langworth (2013).
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experienced both in the Stalinist period, when citizens feared any noise in the 
night: was there a black car coming to take them for torture or forced labor or to 
the scaffold? Here is a simple litmus test: if our lives are dominated by such fears, 
we are living in a dictatorship, but if they do not face fears of that kind from the 
regime, the politico-governmental form is “merely” autocracy.
It is also worth looking at degrees of softness and hardness at various phases of 
a certain politico-governmental form. The succession in history may be of several 
kinds. Communist dictatorship under Stalin was especially hard, but the period 
of Brezhnev and Andropov was more of a soft dictatorship: all the characteris-
tics of dictatorship were present, but with less use of bloodshed or brutality in 
repression .
Many people in Hungary feel that life was easier in the final phase of the Kádár 
regime than it is now, under the third Fidesz government, which started in 2014. 
Certainly, for people avoiding politics, soft, decaying dictatorship is pleasanter 
and easier to bear than hard autocracy. It is more important, however, for the 
comparative theory of systems to point out the boundary between autocracy and 
dictatorship.
Autocracies are inclined to turn into dictatorships. If my study were not lim-
ited to snapshots, if it could depict the dynamics of history as a motion picture, it 
could show that autocracy can turn into dictatorship rapidly or slowly. However, 
the purpose of this study is not to write history, but to create types through a We-
berian approach. Within these bounds it is worth making a pronounced distinc-
tion between autocracy and dictatorship.
The relation between the two typologies
This study has applied two kinds of typology. The relation between them appears 
in Table 3.28
Table 3 illustrates two vital statements. Democracy does not make society im-
mune from autocracy or even dictatorship, into which it may be turned by a com-
bination of unfortunate circumstances, as several historical examples show. To 
mention only the most tragic, Weimar democracy proved defenceless against the 
forces of Nazi dictatorship. There are more recent examples too. Russia’s short-
lived democracy gave way after a few years to the autocracy of Putin.
28  The relation between the market and democracy is analyzed in Gedeon (2014). His conceptual 
apparatus differs from mine in several respects and there is no space here for comparing the 
two, but his conclusions and those of this study overlap in many ways.
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As said earlier, capitalism can operate without democracy, but the statement 
cannot be reversed. Democracy cannot operate without capitalism – “democratic 
socialism” is impossible.29 
Of course this pronouncement depends on the interpretation put on words: the 
“impossibility” applies if the expressions capitalism and socialism are interpreted 
as described in Table 1, and that of democracy as in Table 2.
It is not right to say that establishing the capitalist system suffices or in time 
produces democracy of itself. Capitalism is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for democracy. Of course, the statement about the impossibility of demo-
cratic socialism depends on what is meant by “in time”. Does it mean years, 
decades, even centuries? China in my view can be seen now as having a capital-
ist system, while its politico-governmental form remains a dictatorship. It has 
a one-party system with no legal opposition. The transition from socialism to 
capitalism began decades ago, but there is no sign that the country is any nearer 
to democracy.
The theory of a totalitarian system is associated with the work and name of 
Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1951/2004). Her underlying idea can only be partly fit-
ted into my system of concepts. The last line of Table 3 can be attuned to her use 
of words. Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia are dictatorships of the cruellest, 
hardest kind. To that extent it is right to use the same term for them. Both were 
totalitarian in that the holders of power did not shrink from any means of exerting 
it. Both were also totalitarian in seeking to invade all dimensions of life, includ-
ing the private sphere, people’s most personal affairs: child-bearing, family life, 
personal sexual preferences, and matters of religious faith. Yet there were essen-
tial differences between them. In this analytical context I do not see as the most 
important differences the question of which of the two ideologies was ethically 
more acceptable or from the outset more disgraceful. Nor do I measure the differ-
ence in the number of millions of victims they had. The essential difference is that 
29  This idea appeared in writings about socialism several decades ago. I was influenced especial-
ly by Lindblom (1977). His use of concepts differs from the one in this study, but the ultimate 
conclusion is the same: the democratic form of political power cannot operate under a socialist 
system.
Table 3. Relation between the two kinds of typology
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one operated under a capitalist system and the other under a socialist one. This is 
important not only for comparative systems theory, but for the huge difference it 
made in people’s lives.
Classifi cation of post-socialist countries by the typology of politico-governmental 
forms
Let us now apply the conceptual apparatus outlined above to the countries which 
counted as socialist in 1987, i.e., to the post-socialist region. Figure 3 presents 
another world map.
Democracies appear in light grey, autocracies in dark grey, dictatorships in 
black, while countries of uncertain classification have a diagonally striped pat-
tern.30
Before commenting on the content of the map, let me mention the sources 
from which the two world maps (Figures 2 and 3) were drawn.
Use was made of the classifications in several well-known international re-
ports (Bertelsmann 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; EBRD 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Freedom 
House 2016a, 2016b; World Economic Forum 2016a, 2016b, 2016c).31 We placed 
far-reaching, but not uncritical reliance on these classifications, so that ours dif-
fer from those in one international report or another. The other source is the vast 
literature analyzing single countries or groups of countries. It was only possible 
to consult a fraction of these.32
This world map, like Figure 2, gives a static snapshot of the present, not a dy-
namic, film-like account showing when or how some country moved from one 
politico-governmental form to another. The transition in some was quite rapid 
and in others slow and gradual. Nor was the direction immutable; sometimes it 
doubled back. It would clearly be instructive to show the pace of change, but 
that would far exceed the scope of this study, calling for a sizeable handbook, or 
lengthier still, a book on each country or smaller or larger groups of countries. 
30  Background Material 3 on my website shows in table form the classifications applied on the 
two world maps, Figure 2 and 3 in the main text, furthermore, Background Material 2 on my 
website. It could be said that the two maps convey in color what the table conveys in words.
31  The classifications of post-socialist countries in the reports appear as Background Material 4 
on my website. I am grateful to Ádám Kerényi for his hard, circumspect work in processing 
these inclusive materials and his useful proposals for incorporating the information gathered 
from such rich data banks into the line of thought in my study.
32  Selected reference lists of the huge literature for individual countries or country groups and 
conclusions drawn from the study of a part of this literature are on record in the author’s ar-
chives.
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I regret not having the strength for that, but hope others will undertake such 
huge tasks.
I would like to say a separate word on some countries. Russia, as mentioned, 
developed procedurally in the few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union a 
real multi-party system and operated as a liberal parliamentary democracy. But 
at one point it turned back and became an autocracy that does not shrink from 
tough repression (Sz. Bíró 2012). Of the Soviet successor countries, the three 
Baltic states, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine can be classified as democracies. 
The other Soviet successor states can be seen as autocracies, with one exception: 
Turkmenistan counts as a dictatorship.
There is broad and thorough debate taking place on China’s politico-govern-
mental form and economy, with contributions from the West and from outside 
the People’s Republic (Mainland China), including some from Taiwan and from 
Hong Kong, which is not fully incorporated into the People’s Republic. Sporadi-
cally and within the limits of censorship and self-censorship come voices of those 
still living within the People’s Republic. Let me pick a few from the varied lit-
erature: Pei (2006), Tsai (2007), Chen – Dickson (2008), Huang (2008), Scham-
baugh (2008), Xu (2011), McGregor (2012), King et al. (2013), Lardy (2014), 
Redding – Witt (2014), Székely-Doby (2014), Naughton – Tsai (2015), Csanádi 
(2016) and Schell (2016). 
According to some, China has for a long time possessed the main characteris-
tics of the capitalist system, although the size of the state-owned sector remains 
very great. In politico-governmental form it is clearly a dictatorship in all re-
spects. For a while the dictatorship softened somewhat, but in recent years it has 
hardened again. The leading political force still styles itself the communist party, 
but it abandoned long ago the Leninist program of forcing the dominance of state 
ownership and bureaucratic coordination on society. Another view is that China 
long ago began a transition from socialism to capitalism and from dictatorship 
to democracy, but did so very slowly and cautiously. It will take a long time, but 
there will be a capitalist system in the end. This interpretation does not exclude 
the possibility of a slow transition towards less repressive politico-governmental 
forms. Indeed, the most optimistic expect the transition to end in democracy. 
Finally, a third view taken is that China is a unique formation, semi-socialist 
and semi-capitalist. All this is led by a new kind of politico-governmental form, 
whose characteristics differ from the standard ones of autocracy or dictatorship 
– China as the main manifestation of the “third road”. For my part I accept the 
first view and China has been marked on the two world maps accordingly (Kornai 
2014a, 2014b).
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The two maps reflect the same view of Vietnam and Laos. However, the scarce 
amount of information available for Cambodia suggests that having suffered an 
especially ruthless form of dictatorship, it has since become an autocracy.33
33  As in China, classifying the system in the three Indo-Chinese countries is in dispute. See, for 
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In Figure 2, showing the “socialism versus capitalism” typology, Cuba was 
classified as a country in transition from socialism to capitalism, although it was 
still taking the first steps. The one-party system remains and no opposition can 
operate legally, so that it has been placed among the dictatorships in Figure 3. 
The dictatorship is still there, though softened and somewhat less repressive, but 
the possibility cannot be excluded that its politico-governmental form will move 







Figure 3. World map, 2013–2015. Categories of post-socialist countries according 
to the “democracy – autocracy – dictatorship” typology
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ownership and market coordination spread, the politico-governmental form will 
remain a dictatorship.
Some countries of the post-socialist region has been marked with diagonally 
striped pattern, to signify the author’s uncertainty about which type to place it in. 
This may have several reasons:
(a)  The country has undergone or is undergoing armed conflict. The politico-
governmental form may be varying between democracy, autocracy, and 
even dictatorship. These cases can be found on my website in Background 
material 5.34
(b)  Islam is the most prevalent religion in many of the countries. In some it 
leaves no mark on the operation of the economy or politico-governmen-
tal form, but in others a specific theocratic form of politics and govern-
ment emerges. This could be seen as a sub-type of autocracy. Information 
again appears in Background Material 5. I do not feel conversant enough 
with the Islamic world, so these countries remain problematic and I have 
marked them with the diagonally striped pattern.
(c)  Finally, there are some post-socialist countries that do not belong to either 
(a) or (b) (cannot be characterized with armed conflicts or the increased 
political power of Islam), but insufficient information precludes me from 
placing them in my own typology, and I have marked them with the diago-
nally striped pattern for that reason.
In defence of the term autocracy
Between the extreme types of democracy and dictatorship there is a middle type 
which cannot be termed as either. There is a large measure of consensus about 
this among political scientists and exponents of comparative system theory. How-
ever, there is no such consensus on the criteria for separating democracy and the 
intermediate type. Similarly, it is hard to gauge whether a country is a case of the 
intermediate type or a dictatorship. All I can do in this study is what I did in my 
earlier works: present readers with my own criteria for distinguishing the three 
types. These criteria are summed up in Table 2. Whether readers agree or not, let 
it at least be clear how the author has defined the three forms.
The choice of types ties in closely with their names. Many of the terms used 
in the political sphere have a political ring to them, which means we have left 
the realm of positive, value-free description for that of normative analysis that 
engenders value judgements. I do not want to shut my eyes to this phenomenon. 
34 I am grateful to Andrea Reményi for researching Background Material 5 and compiling Table 2.
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My use of autocracy for the middle type arises partly from my system of values 
and political convictions. I am a democrat devoid of illusions. Despite its short-
comings and dangers I rate this political form best. It would be a big mistake for 
believers in democracy to let the word be used for forms of government whose 
fundamental characteristics are not democratic, and I am wholly against doing 
so. The problem cannot be avoided by qualifying what to me stands for some-
thing so valuable. I dismiss for normative reasons such combinations as “illib-
eral democracy” or “leader democracy” and judge the use of them as harmful.35 
I distinguish the characteristics of democracy and autocracy as types in Table 2 
in such a way as to exclude any kind of “illiberal” or “leader democracy” from 
the former category.
Many people no longer recall the official nomenclature of communist ideology. 
That too used a qualifier. The dictatorship under the socialist system was known 
as “people’s democracy”. This was advanced as true democracy, as opposed to 
“bourgeois democracy”, which was dismissed as mere verbal democracy, for it 
served the bourgeoisie, not the people. My conceptual apparatus defines the char-
acteristics of democracy in a way that requires no grammatical attributes.
The declining “third wave” of democratization
I was strongly influenced by the work of Samuel P. Huntington, especially The 
Third Wave (Huntington 1991). Were he to read this study he would probably 
fault me for putting mere static snapshots on the two world maps. History in his 
view could only be conveyed dynamically. If only I had the strength to create a 
book to include, along with other things, a dynamic description of the transforma-
tion processes in each post-socialist country. This study cannot attempt that. As 
shown earlier, I am imparting static snapshots, which I see as important, useful 
and workable despite their limitations. They provide handgrips for the analysis 
by distinguishing each type sharply: the capitalist system from the socialist, the 
democratic politico-governmental form from autocracy, and autocracy from dic-
tatorship. In my view, it is the absence of such sharp distinctions that leads to 
35  The expression “illiberal democracy” was coined by Zakaria (1997), but when Viktor Orbán 
used it to characterize his own Hungarian politico-governmental form, there was widespread 
protest and Zakaria himself dissociated himself from such usage in an article (Zakaria 2014). 
The term “leader democracy” occurs even in the title of a study by András Körösényi (Körö-
sényi 2003). The antecedants in theoretical history go back to Max Weber and Karl Schmitt 
(Weber 1922/2007; Schmitt 1927–1932/1996). For some further notable contributions to the 
debate on the boundaries and variants of democracy, see Krastev – Holmes (2012), Körösényi 
– Patkós (2015), and Szelényi – Csillag (2015).
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strongly debatable or even erroneous placement of the post-socialist countries in 
Huntington’s figure (Huntington 1991, p. 11, Figure 1.1). 
According to the typology of this study, there was communist dictatorship in 
East Central Europe and the Baltic before the events in 1989–92, although the 
repression had eased somewhat in some countries. The winds were blowing to-
wards democracy, but according to my strict criteria, the minimum conditions for 
democracy were not met. Huntington, however, lists Hungary, Poland, East Ger-
many and the three Baltic states as countries where the first wave of democratiza-
tion took place,36 while he places Bulgaria and Mongolia among those involved 
in the third wave of democratization.
An often quoted metaphor is the glass half-full or half-empty. Huntington re-
joiced (as did millions, I among them) that wave after wave of countries joined 
those with democracy. We are glad that there is a little more water in the glass 
after some decades. But looking at Figure 3, the world map of the distribution of 
politico-governmental forms, it is a bitter sight to see the countries with glasses 
half or three quarters empty. The Soviet Union collapsed, Mao Zedong’s reign 
of terror ended, yet only a tenth of the inhabitants and area of the post-socialist 
region live in countries that can be classified as democracies. The proportions 
appear in a little more detail in Table 4.37
There are no serious signs that democratization is continuing – Huntington’s 
third wave has ceased. In fact, Hungary has undergone what Huntington calls a 
“reverse wave”: a democracy that worked better or worse for a decade or two has 
36  I suspect that the six countries were entered on Huntington’s diagram in the wrong place. It 
emerges from the context that, according to his own periodization, these countries set out on 
the path of democratization not in the first wave, but in the second, which reached its zenith 
in 1962.
37 For more detailed summary figures, see Background Material 4 on my website.
Table 4. Distribution of alternative forms of politics and government in the post-socialist region
Percentage of




Note: Data, rounded off to one decimal place, were drawn from Background Material 4, available on my web-
site, and were calculated on the basis of Background Materials 1 and 3, published on the same site. The totals of 
the two columns are less than 100 by 6.5 and 5.9 percent, respectively. This difference comes from the fact that 
some countries listed in Background Material 3 were not assigned to any of the three groups – their classifica-
tion was considered uncertain.
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relapsed into autocracy.38 There have been plenty of signs of this. Since the gen-
eral elections in 2016, Poland has started along the Hungarian road by destroying 
important institutions serving as checks and balances and moving away from 
democracy and the rule of law. And who knows how many other countries will 
be subjected to the reverse wave.39 
Empirical support for the maps
The main purpose of this study is to review my own conceptual apparatus, and in 
that connection, outline two typologies, and present the criteria that distinguish 
various types. There are no “proving” concepts or typologies. They are no state-
ments whose truth can be confirmed or refused empirically. The conceptual ap-
paratus and typology of a work belong among the tools of the researcher. They 
are expected to be workable and assist in understanding the truth. I consider that 
the apparatus outlined here fulfils that purpose, and I hope to convince as many 
readers as possible of the same. On the other hand, the qualifications made on the 
basis of my own system of concepts and typology (the two maps, Figures 2 and 3 
in this text, Background Material 2 and the table shown in Background Material 
3 on my website) are propositions, susceptible to refusal. Any of the presentations 
of countries on the map may reflect the truth rightly or wrongly (given the criteria 
for placing them). The assertions made by the grey and black tones may be true or 
false, confirmable or dismissible and replaceable by a different assertion.
Several international organizations are engaged in preparing comparative re-
ports to show how countries fare in building up the institutions for their capitalist 
market economies, in ensuring civil rights, or to what extent their forms of gov-
ernment can be considered as democracies, dictatorships, or other formations. 
Each report follows a distinct methodology with differing typologies and clas-
sifications. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any study designed to compare such 
38  The image of a reverse wave is vivid, but not accurate enough. When the wave moving towards 
democracy and a capitalist market economy reverses, it does not arrive where it began. There is 
no sign of the communist system being restored. It was a common remark among the transition 
specialists of the 1990s that you can scramble eggs, but not unscramble them again.
39  It is thought-provoking to read an article by Katalin Balog, a US-based philosophy professor 
born in Hungary, pointing to similarities between the changes in Hungary and the “Trump 
phenomenon” in the United States (Balog 2016). What is shared most closely is the change in 
political discourse: it has become acceptable in speech and writing, social discussion, political 
speeches and press articles, to proclaim racism, xenophobia, and national supremacy. These 
prepare the ground for turning away from democracy. Balog points to a study by Taub (2016), 
which examines the strengthening of American authoritarianism.
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reports with each other or look critically at their methodologies. My assistants 
and I have mainly used the materials of two organizations: Bertelsmann (2016a, 
2016b, 2016c) and Freedom House (2016a, 2016b). While I rate highly the huge, 
conscientious research effort in them and appreciate that the reports are available 
free of charge to politicians, media people and academics, I do not agree with 
their methodologies, conceptual frameworks and criteria in many respects.40 Let 
me mention a few of these.41
My study categorizes in a different way to produce a typology of politico-gov-
ernmental forms. As mentioned, a central place is held by Schumpeter’s proce-
dural approach: reflecting on whether the government can be voted out of office 
in well-defined, civilized, multi-party elections. This embraces the stability of the 
system of checks and balances and effective intervention, the degree of independ-
ence of civil society and lower-level organizations from central government, the 
relative strength of centralizing and decentralizing tendencies, and so on.
What I miss most from the reports mentioned is one of the main ideas in this 
study: they do not sufficiently perceive whether the interaction between con-
stituent anti-market or anti-democratic phenomena produces a coherent system. 
To use an old-fashioned Hegelian expression, the reports in the study of sev-
eral countries did not perceive the critical point where many small quantitative 
changes turn into a qualitative change. It is as if a student were having a given 
performance rated by several different teachers. In many cases I rate more strictly 
than a Bertelsmann or Freedom House report.42 
40  For an overview of reports compiled by international organizations see Backgound Material 
6 on my website. Both Bertelsmann and Freedom House reports use quantitative indica-
tors and qualitative denotations concurrently to convey the state of the country examined. 
Freedom House’s qualitative classifications are tied wholly to quantitative indices. Certain 
ranges of democracy scores (DS) are translated into a qualitative description (e.g., a DS score 
between 6.00 and 7.00 counts as a “consolidated authoritarian regime”). So the entirety of 
Freedom House’s verbal expressions does not amount to a typology, for as I have mentioned, 
a typology emphasizes strong, shared qualitative characteristics. Instead, a Freedom House 
report undertakes a complete classification of each country, giving each class a name. This is 
justified methodologically, but differs from what this study sets out to do. That is why I have 
dealt with this in a footnote, not the text, where I will put down my reservations and critical 
observations.
41  I fully understand the desire of the international comparative reports to add quantitative in-
dicators to their qualitative types, but I cannot cover the advantages and drawbacks of using 
them in this study, which is already too long as it is.
42  Bertelsmann reports make no use of the term dictatorship in their qualitative ratings, prefer-
ring to talk of “hard-line autocracy”. Of course they have a right to name things as they will, 
but it is unfortunate to omit from their vocabulary such a graphic, widespread expression as 
dictatorship. No doubt my regret at this omission is due to my sterner value judgements.
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Let me recall here Table 2, which compares the characteristics of the three 
politico-governmental forms, notably Characteristic 7: Which positions does the 
ruling political group occupy for its own people? To what extent does a degree 
of civil-service autonomy cease? What proportion do “political appointees” rep-
resent of all the functionaries? On paper an institution is seemingly independent, 
but in fact it is wholly controlled by people subordinate to the central will. This 
phenomenon is ill-considered or underestimated by the organizations making in-
ternational comparisons, vital though it is to the transformation of democracy 
into autocracy, or even dictatorship. They are impressed by the rules expressed 
in formal, public words, while unaware of the background selection processes 
whereby the top leader and his subservient underlings place their own people in 
all important positions.
Here I have merely compared the rigor or indulgence in handing out grades, 
without considering the empirical grounding of the judgements. Both Bertels-
mann and Freedom House reports make strong, careful assessments with armies 
of specialists, huge piles of documents and vast data banks behind them. There 
are no such armies behind my two world maps, just research by a few assistants 
and my own analyses. It is with due modesty and caution that I put forward these 
compilations, knowing that the rating of each country is debatable. To return to 
the earlier metaphor: I feel I am not authorized to dispense grades against which 
there is no appeal.
3. HUNGARY’S PLACE ACCORDING TO THE TWO TYPOLOGIES
Applying the general methodological frame to the experience gained 
in Hungary
This part of the study does not aim to supplement the picture drawn about the na-
ture and power structure of the political force ruling Hungary since 2010. There 
are many shelves full of such studies already.43 Each day brings new twists, criti-
43  Prior to the victory of this political force at the 2010 general elections, József Debreczeni 
managed to predict the likely developments in several fields (Debreczeni 2009). First after 
the assumption of power to show the radical changes and processes occurring was a study 
by Gábor Halmai (Halmai 2010), followed by my own study, “Taking Stock” (Kornai 2011), 
which pointed out a radical transformation, i.e., that the government had already dismantled 
some essential institutions of democracy and begun to build up its autocratic rule. Apart from 
a huge number of press articles examining the matter there were several academic studies, of 
which I should highlight here Ágh (2016), Bauer (2016), Bozóki (2016), Kornai (2012, 2015), 
Körösényi (2015), Magyar (2016) and Magyar – Vásárhelyi (2013, 2014, 2015).
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cal reports of which can be found in the press. Nor will I attempt here to make all 
my earlier writings “up-to-date” with the present study.
Hungary is the post-socialist country I know best. I would like to apply the 
analytic apparatus offered in this study – primarily the conceptual framework and 
the two typologies – to the specific Hungarian experience. Can Hungary be fitted 
into the two typologies, or is it a single, unique case? This application tests the 
viability of the analytical apparatus, the conceptual framework, and the typolo-
gies. It also presents an opportunity to go beyond the specific Hungarian case and 
add some further thoughts of more general validity.
Hungary’s capitalism
Let us turn back to Table 1. All three primary and all six secondary characteristics 
of capitalism apply in Hungary. It is not on any “third road”. It cannot be classed 
as a non-capitalist, non-socialist system.
Capitalism is a very strong system, capable of significant achievements even 
under inimical conditions. Its strength has been apparent in Hungary, above all in 
acceleration of technical progress. Achievements of the high-technology period 
spread at a rapid pace, and the country itself contributed more than one revolu-
tionary innovation. Despite many mistakes and omissions in economic policy, the 
economy has climbed out of its trough. GDP is rising, although the growth rate 
is modest: it is not as fast as the acceleration usually manifesting during rapid 
growth after a crisis. This is true capitalism, although the beneficial aspects of 
it have been weaker and the repugnant ones stronger than those experienced in 
many more favorable variants.
The ruling politico-governmental system exerts a strong influence on the Hun-
garian economy, but I do not find it apposite to call it “state capitalism”.44 That 
term is surrounded by utter confusion. Many use it to assert that the state has 
adopted functions of capitalist private ownership, or that the state itself has turned 
capitalist. That is certainly not the case. However strong the desire of those in 
power may be to increase their wealth, it is wrong to see this as a single motivat-
44  The term “state capitalism” has been used by politicians and political analysts of various per-
suasions (from shades of the socialist and communist movements through liberals to fascists). 
Some apply it to a formation congenial to them, others to one they oppose. A serviceable 
account of its history appears in Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_capitalism]. 
One interesting branch of Hungarian discourse on the subject was the 2005 debate between 
János Kis and Gáspár Miklós Tamás (two philosophers) on socialism, capitalism and state 
capitalism (Tamás 2005; the 2005 article by Kis was published again in the author’s volume 
of collected writings: Kis 2014, pp. 429–439).
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ing force. The machinery of the state is not being operated according to the rules 
of the capitalist market economy.
All kinds of capitalism display entwining of the political sphere (the state ap-
paratus run by ruling parties, legislators and the government leadership) with the 
business sphere. This entwining is unusually strong in Hungary, and occurs along 
many strands and by many means. All kinds of capitalism bring corruption. This 
is unusually common in Hungary, involves huge sums of money, and appears 
in many different forms. This entwining and corruption appear at first glance as 
a proliferating jungle, but further examination of it reveals a few characteristic 
features:
1. The state sector is spreading again, if only to a modest extent (Mihályi 
2015). The form it takes is usually not confiscation of privately owned firms, 
banks or other organizations, though that too occurs. The methods are more re-
fined. The state often buys up hitherto privately owned firms, banks or other 
organizations at depressed prices, having first used state powers to impede their 
operation and turn them into lossmakers. It then places its own loyal people at 
the head of such a state-owned firm or financial organization. This gains it strong 
positions in business life.
2. Often a business unit on the verge of collapse is bought by the state at a 
negligible price, then boosted from public funds, rendered viable again, and rep-
rivatized. The selling price will not be high and the gains will be made by new 
owners close to Fidesz, the ruling party.
3. A very high proportion of state expenditure goes on financing the current 
operation of the governmental machinery, and on investments financed wholly 
or partly out of public funds. To the latter can be added as a source the large 
contributions for structural transformation of the country received from the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), whose allocation rests with the Hungarian government. All 
these state expenditures are spent in a biased way. Where loopholes in the law 
allow, the procedures for public procurement are circumvented. Where there is 
no way of avoiding them, they are bent to ensure that firms close to the governing 
party make the winning bids. This allows giant firms or empires of companies to 
expand at great speed, and it can be that some of the extra profits find their way 
back into the pockets of those who eased the path to winning the competitive bid-
ding. Normally the police and the state prosecution show no inclination to seek 
evidence of such apparent corruption.45 Decision-makers are often led by politi-
45  To an extent the task of investigating corruption is taken up by non-governmental media, re-
search groups and opposition politicians. (To pick an example, a report of the Corruption Re-
search Center Budapest (2016a) produced comprehensive data based on a very large sample.) 
But revealing corruption is only a first step. Its effects are limited unless published suspicions 
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cal bias and personal advantage in matters of public procurement, careers in state 
service, pay of leaders, bail-outs of endangered firms and other organizations, 
and softening of budget constraints. The beneficiaries become loyal supporters 
of the ruling group; a patron/client relation develops between holders of politi-
cal power and those to whom they give preference. There spreads the repugnant 
phenomenon known in the literature as clientelism and crony capitalism.
4. To the cases just described can be added all-too-common ones where ben-
eficiaries have family or kinship ties with decision-makers. Such immoral occur-
rences have long been known as nepotism.
5. The arsenal includes not only reward, but dissuasive punishment. If the head 
of a capitalist group aims too high or moves too close to the pyramid of power, 
there is retaliation: procurement bids and business takeovers will fail, administra-
tive penalties will be imposed, and regulations will appear that restrict activity.
6. The expression state capture has joined the vocabulary of political studies 
and is not rare in Hungary either: legislation and other regulations are tailored to 
the needs of specific capitalist groups. The opposite effect is at least as common: 
the state captures the business realm. State leaders appoint and dismiss the oli-
garchs. Such intervention by politicians and bureaucrats extends from the top of 
the business hierarchy down to the middle management levels. They decide who 
gets rich quick, sometimes with lightning speed, and whose wealth diminishes.
This particular Hungarian variant of collaboration of the ruling political group 
and the business realm, with dominance of the former and widespread corruption, 
has led to the term mafia state, coined by Bálint Magyar and now widespread in 
political parlance.46 There is certainly a strong similarity between what happens 
in Hungary and in the mafias of Italy, the United States, Russia and many other 
places. Luckily for us, there are essential differences. The “godfather” or small 
group ruling a mafia punish insubordination not with dismissal or employment in 
a less powerful but still comfortable position, but with execution. A death threat 
ensures unconditional obedience. It is a stronger disciplinary method than demo-
tion and/or deprival of fat earnings.47 
are followed by police investigations, criminal charges, court procedures, and penal sentences 
on the guilty. That is all a state monopoly. Not even the most impartial judge can sentence those 
against whom police and prosecutors have not made impartial investigations and filed charges.
46  Bálint Magyar began using the expression in the early 2000s. For details on this term, see 
Magyar 2016, pp. 1–55  and Magyar – Vásárhelyi 2013, pp. 9–85. See furthermore Magyar – 
Vásárhelyi 2014 and 2015.
47  Albert Hirschman pointed out in a brilliant essay that there are two organizations against 
which there is and can be no opposition, either by voice or by exit: Stalinist power and the 
mafia (Hirschman 1970). Under today’s Hungarian system it is possible to protest by word of 
mouth or by exit, or if all else fails, by the extreme form of exit, leaving the country.
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Most of Characteristics 1 to 6, elucidated above, are not fuelled merely by 
motives of power or money. There can be discerned in them also a national-
ist tendency. Where possible, preference goes to businesses in Hungarian, rather 
than foreign or multinational ownership.48 This is one normative principle when 
judging public procurement bids. The nationalist government may also resort to 
other weapons, such as manipulating the foreign exchange rate. A falling Hungar-
ian forint will make imports more costly and thereby improve the sales chances of 
more expensive Hungarian producers, at the expense of consumers.
Leading government politicians are often heard to make anti-capitalist re-
marks. This should not mislead people. The system under which Hungarians live 
is a capitalist one.
Hungary’s autocracy
Let us turn back to Table 2. All four primary and all six secondary characteristics 
of autocracy are met in Hungary. I am aware that the state of affairs in Hungary 
is still a matter of debate among critical domestic and foreign analysts: Can Hun-
gary be called a democracy even though many chances have ensued that are alien 
to democracy? As I noted earlier, there is no consensus among specialists, politi-
cians or politically minded citizens on how to interpret the concept of democracy, 
and so I am not expecting this study to convince anybody that it is wrong to 
qualify Hungary as such. I trust only that for those who have followed the study 
so far it is plain and clear that Hungary is an autocracy according to the typology 
presented here.
Let me stress the minimum conditions for autocracy: a government that cannot 
be voted out by the customary democratic processes; a system of institutions (in-
troduction of electoral regulations advantageous to the incumbent political force, 
reduction of the funds required for the opposition to function effectively; drastic 
curtailment of the influence of the opposition press and media, etc.) that almost 
guarantees Fidesz electoral victory.49 The ruling party fills leading positions at all 
levels with its trusty people. It has installed its own “checks and balances” even 
for the unlikely event that the opposition wins the elections, assuring that the reli-
48  There are exceptions. A strong, prestigious multinational firm with a “strategic agreement” 
with the government may receive special treatment. Where two priorities clash – strengthen-
ing central power and nationalist bias in favor of Hungarian capital, the former usually proves 
stronger.
49  If need be Fidesz will enter into open or secret coalition with the far-right party Jobbik. The 
nightmare memory looms of the fall of Weimar democracy: the coalition of former Chancellor 
Franz von Papen and other conservative politicians with the Nazi party.
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able people appointed by the present ruling group will remain in key posts and 
impede the normal operation of a new government.
It came as no surprise to those who looked at likely events without wishful 
thinking.50 True democrats can accept it if they lose an election. Viktor Orbán 
could not accept his defeat in 2002 and 2006 and resolved it should never happen 
to him again. In his famous speech at Kötcse in 2009 he announced in advance 
that Hungary needed a right-wing regime that could stay in place for at least 
15–20 years.51 I count myself among those who took Orbán’s determination seri-
ously. The first signs of him building an autocracy were clear a few months after 
he took power.
Unfortunately, the first signs of danger had little effect. Years went by before 
the full danger to democracy became clear to Hungarian and foreign observers. 
The reactions of the EU and other international bodies were slow and feeble. De-
mocracy is a fragile and vulnerable politico-governmental system, since its very 
liberalism makes it grant freedom of expression and assembly also to enemies of 
democracy. The EU, built on democratic principles, had, and it seems, still has no 
effective means of halting anti-democratic actions.
Autocracy, as I said earlier, may be softer or harder. In Hungary, the signs 
of hardening are appearing, but I still would not class the present situation as 
dictatorship. It suffices to look at Table 2. Among the primary characteristics 
of a dictatorship is a one-party system with a total absence of legal opposition. 
Likewise a primary characteristic is terror: mass arrests, grim forced labor camps, 
mass political murders, death sentences imposed under arbitrary rules devised by 
the dictatorship, or exceeding even its own laws, investigators who torture their 
victims or shoot them dead.
Memories of dictatorship are still strong in the older generations, and they can 
distinguish between autocracy and dictatorship at a glance. A false distinction 
may arise not only from wishful thinking, but from fear (perhaps not unfounded) 
of a bad future that has penetrated our thinking. Autocracy, as the middle politico-
governmental form in the typology, must be distinguished from democracy on the 
one hand and dictatorship on the other.52
50  “Wishful thinking” describes well the particularly distorted, biased outlook on future events: in-
dividual desires and hopes are embedded in rational and objective thinking, which unavoidably 
blurs the boundary between a positive aspect (what is) and a normative aspect (what should be).
51  Orbán’s speech was heard a few months before he took power. An edited version appeared in 
the weekly Nagyítás early in 2010. The references to this study include the URL for the text at 
the Fidesz website (Orbán 2009/2010). 
52  I understand the horror at the danger of fascism, but disagree with those who term, like Ungváry 
(2014) in his otherwise excellent volume of analyses, the Hungarian politico-governmental 
formation “fascistoid”.
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Nor is the leadership cult a specific characteristic among the three types in my 
typology. The admiration for Viktor Orbán that has arisen, in part spontaneously 
and in part artificially, is not an exceptional phenomenon, not one apparent only 
in Hungary. It appears in almost all autocracies and dictatorships, either in an 
extreme form almost of worship of the leader, or more soberly. More rarely, char-
ismatic figures may appear in democracies as well: the aura around Churchill , 
or later De Gaulle or Roosevelt, in the critical periods of the Second World War. 
I avoid the widespread term “authoritarian” regime or “authoritarianism” for 
blurring the distinctions, because in a democracy, an autocracy or a dictatorship 
alike there can appear a person at the peak of power who has high prestige and au-
thority, whether to serve good purposes successfully or evil ones cruelly, whether 
the admiration is voluntary or thrust upon the people, and whether the person on 
the peak is worthy or unworthy of respect.
The foreign policy of the Hungarian government
Mention has already been made of strong nationalist tendencies in the autocracy 
of Hungary, but only in domestic affairs, for the benefit of Hungarian producers 
and entrepreneurs, at the expense of foreign-owned or multinational companies 
in Hungary. To this has been attached a well-known “national” economic policy: 
making imports harder, for instance through monetary policy that pushes up their 
prices. Let us now extend the examination to foreign policy.
Memories of the catastrophes and bloodshed of the two world wars, careful 
study of how the conflicts arose, and the conclusions drawn prompted Western 
European statesmen to found the association of countries which evolved into 
today’s European Union. Let there be no more war among the great countries of 
Europe, not least because such war had burgeoned into world war twice in the last 
century. Also behind this was a community of economic and political interests, 
but the prime purpose was to ensure peace in Europe: peaceful coordination of 
their countries’ interests and a common approach in support of European ideas, 
rather than threats and armed conflicts. From the outset there were internal antag-
onisms to contend with: integration to the degree found in the United States was 
out of the question in a region of European countries deeply affected by centuries 
of national traditions. Within every member state there is rivalry between politi-
cal forces ready to concede more sovereignty and those not prepared to do so and 
wanting to move back to the fullest degree of sovereignty.
Although these two forces exist in all EU countries, it is specific to Hungary to 
find such methodical efforts to weaken EU powers, ignore its regulations, exploit 
legal loopholes, and make anti-Brussels rhetoric integral to official government 
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policy. This approach has been taken by Prime Minister Orbán in a small member 
state dependent on imports and foreign investment and on the EU funds available 
for free. He is becoming known increasingly abroad as a leading light in national-
ism and rebellion against European cohesion.
Of assistance to the ruling Hungarian political force in this was the wave of 
refugees from war-torn countries that reached Hungary in 2015: people by the 
hundred thousand, mainly Muslim adults, seeking the security and higher living 
standards of developed European countries. Many of them lack the ability or will 
to assimilate. There begins to appear a case of what Huntington described in a 
1992 lecture as a clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996). The wave of refugees 
found the leaders of the most developed countries unprepared. They responded 
with human empathy, as humanism dictates and all true democrats can only agree 
with that. But they did so without a plan for containing an unending stream, or 
organizing and financing the coexistence with the people streaming in. The words 
and acts of the European political leaders were hasty and inconsistent. The confu-
sion, impatience or even xenophobia arising in several countries was enhanced 
by bloody acts of terrorism, and by the terror and threats of ISIS. Orbán from the 
outset refused decisively and clearly to grant any migrants refuge. He expressed 
crude outrage against the volunteers who displayed humanitarian sympathy to-
wards them. His rough words stirred an outrage among people who expressed hu-
mane empathy for the suffering, but enthralled members of the Hungarian public 
who were already inclined to xenophobia. Hungary became the first country in 
Europe to erect a razor-wire fence along its southern borders. This act was ini-
tially condemned, but later imitated by foreign politicians.
I will not detail the further problems arising from the migration wave and acts 
of terrorism, or conflicts between national sovereignty and European cohesion. 
I simply want to indicate these factors and place them in the thematic field of 
this study. Nationalism and xenophobia are not specifically Hungarian, but the 
methods chosen by the ruling party and government for addressing these ambigu-
ous problems are constituting a Hungaricum.53 There is a danger that Hungar-
ian policy will make waves beyond the country’s borders and attract adherents. 
Hungary, sadly, has a tradition of policy swings. The group in power likes to call 
its rule democracy and claim Hungary a place in the culture of European Christi-
anity. Meanwhile there are heard repeated speeches that belittle Western democ-
racy and talk of the decline of the West, while lauding many Eastern versions of 
despotism, citing the tyrannical regimes of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, 
53  The nationalism of the political group in power has deep roots and traditions which date back 
hundreds of years. On this topic see Agárdi (2015), Kende (2013), Rainer (2012, 2013), and 
Ungváry (2014). 
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the hard-line government of Singapore, the semi-feudal Islamic autocracies of 
the Arab sheikdoms, and the ever-hardening dictatorship in China. Clearly there 
are also economic intentions behind this: the Eastern orientation is expected to 
yield investment, loans and big orders. But there are other motives too: affinity 
felt between its own autocracy and the methods of Afro-Asian despotism. This 
double game is also unique to Hungary: it is not a common characteristic of all 
autocracies.
A Hungarian hybrid?
Some decades ago I gave a lecture taking issue with those who sought an “op-
timal” system, a combination of the best rules of the game. Let me quote what 
I said: “Those aiming for this somehow imagine themselves in a big supermarket. 
There on the shelves can be seen the various mechanism constituents, embodi-
ments of various beneficial system characteristics… Those designing a system 
have nothing to do but gather up ‘optimal elements’ into a shopping cart and go 
home to fit up an ‘optimal system’. Except that this is a naive dream. History does 
not maintain any such supermarket from which we can choose at will… The only 
choice for those deciding what system to adopt is between various pre-packaged 
tie-ins” (Kornai 1980b, p. 290).
So when Viktor Orbán and his political partners built up their power, were they 
refuting, through their deeds, my assertion of 36 years before? Has it rendered the 
metaphor of history’s supermarket offering system elements erroneous?
Many people see the actual Hungarian system of today as a particular mix of 
the socialist and capitalist systems, containing elements of both, as a half-social-
ist, half-capitalist hybrid. It is also thought widely that Hungary’s politico-gov-
ernmental form is a particular mix of democracy and dictatorship, it is a hybrid, 
obtained by the cross-fertilizing of a democracy-plant and a dictatorship-plant.
My study rejects this system-theoretical innovation. The Hungary we inhabit 
is no hybrid. It is a special kind of capitalism, and a specific kind of autocracy. 
The conceptual frame and analytical apparatus of my study lead directly to this 
conclusion.
I must not omit to say that the supermarket metaphor only defines the sharp 
contours of the social formations. Beside other experiences, the changes in Hun-
gary also point to a need to refine my earlier theory. 
There appear in the capitalism of present-day Hungary and other countries is-
lands that resemble socialism. Foremost is the health-care sector, where the state 
dominates the supply side in many countries, while on the demand side free or 
almost free provision is offered. This generates a secondary socialist character-
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istic: a shortage economy. Symptoms can be seen: actual queuing in out-patient 
clinics or virtual queuing on arbitrarily long waiting lists. Concomitant is a grey 
or black economy of gratuities to medics that ease frictions in by lubricating the 
machinery of the official supply. Yet such socialism is literally an island in a 
capitalist sea.
The transition to capitalism is largely over in Hungary and the other post-
socialist countries, but much of the legacy of socialism remains, above all in 
people’s mentality. Far from disliking the paternalism of the state, many dispute 
their responsibility to see to themselves and expect the country’s leader to guide 
and look after them. That is one reason why Hungary underwent such a smooth 
turn away from the rule of law, the enforcement of contracts, and broad local 
self-governance. Centralization has strengthened. However, the ruling political 
power has no intention of returning to the starting point, to the position before the 
change of system by restoring socialism. After carrying out the turn, they halted 
on the road which leads away from democracy, rule of law, decentralization, and 
respect for private ownership. The regime has every reason to maintain the au-
tocratic capitalism in its particular Hungarian form. As mentioned before, the 
intention is far from ending the dominance of private ownership. What the regime 
really wants is reinforcing the links between the ruling political force, leading bu-
reaucrats and the business realm, and thus strengthening the position of political 
power holders therein. The aim is not to abolish the market, simply to intervene 
in populist manner (such as arbitrarily reducing certain utility charges below the 
market price), and/or to interfere crudely in the fine machinery of market coor-
dination for selfish financial gain. Since the primary characteristics of capital-
ism have survived, the Hungarian system of institutions is not semi-socialist and 
semi-capitalist. Capitalism persists, but in a specifically Hungarian form where 
its repugnant characteristics are particularly strong.
The present politico-governmental form in Hungary was not brought into 
being by a leading politician pushing a shopping cart round and filling it with 
elements of democracy and dictatorship, in order to aptly assemble their “opti-
mal” combination. It was more a question of selecting various specific elements 
of the system sitting on the shelves like different loaves in the supermarket 
bakery department or different cold cuts in the delicatessen department. Those 
who devised the present Hungarian system of institutions chose alternative ele-
ments throughout the system of institutions. For instance, when dividing up the 
branches of the state, choosing and assigning powers to the so-called independ-
ent institutions (central bank, audit office, budgetary council, etc.), and setting 
out how judges were to be appointed. The main selection criterion was how to 
make their power stronger and less easy to remove. From the UK’s democracy 
they adopted perhaps the worst characteristic, i.e., a disproportionate distribu-
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tion of mandates after general elections. The British “winner takes all” principle 
in single-round elections makes it almost impossible for a coalition of several 
opposition parties to emerge. From the US democracy, they took over the idea 
that supreme court members could stay in their posts for a very long time if 
they wished. So a constitutional court judge chosen and appointed by Fidesz 
would remain in his/her position and maintain loyalty to the political group 
which appointed him even if the opposition should win the next parliamentary 
elections.
Government propaganda has it that the country took politically a specifically 
Hungarian “third road”. In truth, when the government took over, its starting 
point was democracy; one with many faults – more corruption and incompetence 
than Western democracies matured over long periods – but still a democracy. This 
impeded the main aim of the new power holders: to stay in power through several 
parliamentary terms while maintaining outward signs of democracy. They took 
another course: building autocracy fast and decisively. They were not taking a 
well-worn path, as various countries at various times arrived at autocracy in vari-
ous ways. There was much improvization and many unawaited developments, 
but they reached full autocracy quite soon.
The Peron type of autocracy in Argentina started out from the trade-union 
movement, and it gained wide support by introducing regulations that benefited 
the workers and lower classes. By contrast, the moves of the present Hungarian 
variant serve to benefit the well-to-do strata of society to the detriment of the 
poor, the dispossessed, the handicapped, the ill and the old.
To sum up, in terms of primary and secondary characteristics (see Tables 1 
and 2), my answer to the question raised in the title of this section – Is there 
a Hungarian hybrid? – is a decisive no. To use the reference frame of the sys-
tem paradigm presented in the study, the specific Hungarian characteristics are 
“merely” tertiary, although by that I am not trying to belittle the notably harmful 
effects of the specific Hungarian form, which cause much suffering to a high 
proportion of the population.
The Orbán system
The socio-historical formation that has emerged in Hungary is indeed unique to 
the same extent only as all other socio-historical constructs. Present-day Albania, 
Mongolia and Vietnam are also “unique” in this sense. This statement is compat-
ible logically with the fact that each concrete system is a historical realization of 
a certain type according to the criteria defined by some typology. The same type 
has other historical realizations as well.
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The present form of Hungarian society is a specific instance of a broader cat-
egory: autocratic capitalism. Viewing this through the eyeglasses of comparative 
system-theory, it can be seen that Hungary’s system has characteristics in com-
mon with other autocratic capitalist formations, but also attributes that distin-
guish it from all other countries belonging to the same type.
It is right to speak of an Orbán system. As noted in the introduction to the 
study, the word “system” applies to a wide variety of formations. The character-
istics of Orbán’s Hungary amount to a system because they affect and reinforce 
each other. Each serves a common purpose: to boost, solidify and render irremov-
able the power of its leadership and its head, Viktor Orbán.
Many aspects of the system are stamped with Orbán’s personality. I am not one 
to belittle the effect personality traits in leading politicians have on the course of 
history. Their individual traits is one of the powerful factors explaining for the 
differences between the autocracies of Horthy, the head of the Hungarian state 
in the period 1920–1944, and Orbán: the two differ in social background, family 
and educational upbringing, military experience, system of value, culture and 
psyche. 
In Orbán’s case there has emerged a stratum of tens of thousands whom he 
has placed in high posts and enriched. They defend the status quo vigorously out 
of self-interest, not just beacuse they are loyal to their leader but to retain their 
power and wealth.
Once the Orbán system took shape, it began to develop its own operating 
mechanisms and evolutionary and selective attributes. Institutions appear or give 
way to others that better serve the main purpose of strengthening power. People 
rise to fame and power, only to fall again (usually into still cosy, well paid, but 
less powerful posts). More new faces appear, yet more enthusiastic and anxious 
to serve the leader. There is no need for central commands in lesser matters: faith-
ful subordinates can even read their superiors’ thoughts. Of course, the smooth 
operation of this machinery requires that all the others, the subordinates of the 
few thousand people grasping power in their hands, i.e. the millions of ordinary 
citizens accept the current situation unresistingly and silently. Their silent passiv-
ity is also a unique Hungaricum, embedded in centuries of Hungarian history. The 
dynamics of resignation and patience, or protest and rebellion, present research-
ers with politically relevant and intellectually stimulating problems, to which this 
study cannot extend.
Although it is quite clear to me that social formations constantly change, this 
study compares the types mainly through static pictures. It would be good to take 
things further to show the typologies of change, the types through which great so-
cial transformations occur: slow or fast, by revolutions or reforms, through shocks 
or in small steps, bloodily or bloodlessly. For instance, there could be compiled 
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a typology for the rise and fall of great worldwide empires, from ancient times to 
the present day, including those of Germany, the Soviet Union or Britain.
That brings us to the difference between the approaches in two groups of dis-
ciplines: history and the modern social sciences (economics, sociology, political 
science). The main body of historians see historical processes as unique succes-
sions of differing situations. Only a few scholars attempt to create philosophies 
or theories of history. Those of Marx, Spengler and Toynbee differ strongly, but 
they share an aim of pinpointing regularities within the complex processes of his-
tory. Among social scientists this approach is not exceptional, but general, I could 
even say, mandatory. While business schools are busy with case studies, and eco-
nomic historians may chart the course of a specific bank or manufacturer, most 
members of university departments of economics build models and introduce 
their students to apply them. There is no sense in discussing which discipline 
has the more important standard approach. Both are needed, both must remain. 
I hope this study will reach a few historians, especially those of them who study 
the contemporary period. Perhaps their ideas can also be enriched by a paradigm 
that recognizes alternative systems, characteristic formations and types, where 
they see only details of a unique and never-recurrent process.
CLOSING REMARKS
This study makes recommendations to researchers analyzing and comparing vari-
ous social systems, as to how they can approach such subjects. Although inspired 
by experience of the post-socialist region, I am sure its underlying ideas can be 
applied to analyzing countries elsewhere.
I have advanced an updated version of the system paradigm described in my 
earlier work, as one of the possible approaches. I have discussed closely two 
typologies (capitalism versus socialism and democracy–autocracy–dictatorship) 
as two of the possible alternative typologies. My emphases convey that the para-
digm and two typologies I put forward are not exclusive. In doing so I am not 
seeking peace or avoiding controversies, simply expressing my conviction that 
no single, universally applicable methodology can suffice to analyze society. No 
single paradigm, no single system of concepts and no single typology can claim 
a monopoly on solving every problem.
Let us imagine a formation of several materials with a complex structure, in 
a three-dimensional space. Such things are exhibited by sculptors or “visual art-
ists.”
The creation is a lively spectacle if seen from afar. That is how we sense the 
creation as a whole. The sight of it constantly changes as it is approached. (For 
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example, we can perceive the outlines of the politico-governmental forms if only 
three types are distinguished, as this study has done. The picture becomes more 
subtle if sub-types are added to each category, or still finer distinctions are made 
by breaking it down into sub-sub-types.) For understanding it, there is no perfect 
distance between the observer and the observed artifact. All perspectives have 
their useful role to play.
Imagine that several spotlights have been fixed to the walls and the ceiling, 
each giving off light of a different color. The spectator sees the artifact differently 
depending on which spotlight is on and which color shines. And if the museum 
allows us to take various sections of the artifact, crosswise and lengthways, in all 
directions, again there will be various patterns to see. No view, no section offers 
the “true” shape. All views are “true”, if the spotlight’s shine is strong; all sec-
tions are “true” if studied by expert eyes.
This study had the modest aim of proposing one or two spotlights and one or 
two possible sections for analysts. I am open to understanding and applying other 
approaches and typologies as well.
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